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Abstract 11 
Although play-fighting is widespread among juvenile mammals, its adaptive significance remains 12 
unclear. It has been proposed that play is beneficial for developing skills to improve success in adult 13 
contests (motor training hypothesis), but the links between juvenile play-fighting and adult aggression 14 
are complex and not well understood. In this theoretical study, we investigate the coevolution between 15 
juvenile play-fighting and adult aggression using evolutionary computer simulations. We consider a 16 
simple life history with two sequential stages: a juvenile phase in which individuals play-fight with 17 
other juveniles to develop their fighting skills; and an adult phase in which individuals engage in 18 
potentially aggressive contests over access to resources and ultimately mating opportunities, leading 19 
to reproductive success. The simulations track genetic evolution in key traits affecting adult contests, 20 
such as the level of aggression, as well as juvenile investment in play-fighting, capturing the 21 
coevolutionary feedbacks between juvenile and adult decisions. We find that coevolution leads to one 22 
of two outcomes: a high-play, high-aggression situation with highly aggressive adult contests 23 
preceded by a prolonged period of juvenile play-fighting to improve fighting ability, or a low-play, 24 
low-aggression situation in which adult contests are resolved without fighting and there is minimal 25 
investment in play-fighting before individuals mature. Which of these outcomes is favoured depends 26 
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on the mortality costs and on the type of societal structure: societies with strong reproductive skew, 27 
favouring monopolisation of resources, show high levels of adult aggression and high investment in 28 
juvenile play-fighting, whereas societies with low reproductive skew have both low adult aggression 29 
and low levels of play-fighting. A review of empirical evidence, particularly in the primate genus 30 
Macaca, highlights some limitations of our model and suggests that other, complementary functional 31 
explanations are needed to account for the full range of competitive and cooperative forms of play-32 
fighting. Our study illustrates the power of evolutionary simulations to shed light on the long-standing 33 
puzzle of animal play. 34 
Keywords: play-fighting, social play, motor training hypothesis, evolutionary simulations, 35 
individual-based model, egalitarian–despotic 36 
 37 
Introduction 38 
 39 
The functional significance of play behaviour in animals is an enduring puzzle in evolutionary 40 
biology (Graham & Burghardt 2010). Burghardt (2005) defined play as behaviour that is (i) not 41 
immediately necessary for current survival; (ii) spontaneous, done for its own sake; (iii) exaggerated, 42 
using modified patterns of other behaviours; (iv) repeated, but not in a manner that is rigidly 43 
stereotyped; and (v) performed in a stress-free environment. Note that none of these five criteria 44 
identifies a potential adaptive benefit. Evidence suggests that play involves short-term costs, such as 45 
increased exposure to predators (Blumstein, 1998), injuries (Berger, 1980) and energy costs to the 46 
players (Caro, 1995). Set against these costs, a range of hypotheses have been put forward to explain 47 
the evolution of play in terms of delayed benefits in adulthood — most prominently, that play is an 48 
aid to the development of adult motor skills (the ‘motor training’ hypothesis; Brownlee, 1954; Byers 49 
& Walker, 1995; Fagen, 1981). Observational studies have found some support for this hypothesis 50 
(Baldwin & Baldwin, 1976; Berghänel, Schülke, & Ostner, 2015; Byers & Walker, 1995; Lumia, 51 
1972). For example, Berghänel et al. (2015) found a positive correlation between juvenile locomotor 52 
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play and motor skills acquisition in Assamese macaques (Macaca assamensis), but also sizeable costs 53 
of play in terms of reduction of growth. However, there are also conflicting results (e.g. Mancini & 54 
Palagi, 2009; Sharpe, 2005) and no clear consensus on the adaptive significance of play has been 55 
reached (Caro, 1988; Pellis & Iwaniuk, 1999). 56 
Among the diverse forms of play, social play and, specifically, play-fighting are widespread 57 
among juvenile mammals (Palagi et al., 2015; Pellis, Field, Smith, & Pellis, 1997; Pellis & Pellis, 58 
2017). Play-fighting involves non-aggressive interactions in which one or more individuals gains 59 
advantages over its counterparts (Aldis, 1975). Evidence suggests that play-fighting typically 60 
includes elements of both competition (Symons, 1978) and cooperation (Altmann, 1962). The main 61 
differences between cooperative and competitive aspects of play-fighting are summarised in Table 1, 62 
following the competition/cooperation model (Reinhart, 2008; Pellis, Pellis, & Reinhart, 2010). The 63 
dyadic nature of play-fighting is manifested differently in species with diverse societal organisation 64 
and it has been suggested that competitive interactions are a particularly important aspect of 65 
development in mammals that have a strong dominance hierarchy in adulthood (Chase, Tovey, 66 
Spangler-Martin, & Manfredonia, 2002). If, as proposed by the motor-training hypothesis and several 67 
other evolutionary explanations, play offers delayed benefits in adulthood (Graham & Burghardt, 68 
2010), we might expect juvenile investment in play-fighting to covary across species with features of 69 
the adult social environment, such as the societal structure and the level of adult aggression. In line 70 
with this, numerous studies in the genus Macaca have shown a strong correlation across species 71 
between the adult social environment and various features of juvenile social play, including the 72 
duration of play sequences, the expression of different interaction patterns (e.g. wrestling), the 73 
number of players involved and the use of certain body postures (Petit, Bertrand, & Thierry, 2008). 74 
However, to make clear evolutionary predictions about patterns of play-fighting, it is crucial 75 
to take into account the strong coevolutionary feedbacks that are likely to operate between juvenile 76 
and adult social adaptations (Thierry, 2004). While play may promote the development of skills to 77 
increase expected lifetime fitness, the magnitude of such benefits is likely to be strongly contingent 78 
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on environmental (including social) conditions and the decisions made in adulthood (e.g. aggressive 79 
behaviour when competing for resources). This interplay can be challenging to study empirically, but 80 
theoretical studies can provide important insights (Pellis, Burghardt, Palagi, & Mangel, 2015) and are 81 
a particularly powerful tool when interactions between individuals affect population responses 82 
(DeAngelis & Mooij, 2005). There have been only a few previous attempts to model play behaviour 83 
in the literature (Durand & Schank, 2015; Grunloh & Mangel, 2015). For example, Durand and 84 
Schank (2015) developed an evolutionary simulation based on the stag-hunt game (Rousseau, 1992) 85 
to explore adult influences on juvenile social play, focusing on cooperation among individuals. Their 86 
model predicted that play enhances social cohesion among juveniles and subsequently drives adult 87 
cooperation. 88 
In the present study, we develop a series of computer simulations in which juvenile strategies 89 
for play-fighting can coevolve with adult strategies for competition over resources. Our focus is on 90 
competitive forms of play-fighting that function to improve adult fighting skills, so our model should 91 
be viewed as complementary to Durand and Schank’s (2015) model of cooperative play-fighting. We 92 
model a simple life cycle: individuals are born into a ‘juvenile’ stage in which they have play-fighting 93 
interactions with other juveniles, before progressing (at a point determined by their evolved strategy) 94 
to an ‘adult’ stage in which they have contests that determine their share of reproduction. We explore 95 
the coevolutionary dynamics between juvenile play-fighting and adult competition under a range of 96 
societal structures induced by variation in the degree of reproductive skew. If reproduction is 97 
monopolised by a small number of individuals, competition between adults is expected to be fierce, 98 
with disputes resolved using intense physical aggression, whereas societies in which all individuals 99 
have a similar chance of reproducing are likely to be more peaceful (Hemelrijk, 2002). By inducing 100 
such variation in the adult social environment and modelling its coevolution with juvenile play-101 
fighting, we can generate testable predictions about how patterns of juvenile play-fighting and the 102 
intensity of adult competition should covary across species. 103 
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Following the motor training hypothesis, we assume that play may be costly in the short term 104 
but that it enhances the development of motor skills that increase fitness pay-offs in adulthood 105 
(Brownlee, 1954; Byers & Walker, 1995; Fagen, 1981). Specifically, investment in play-fighting is 106 
assumed to increase an individual’s strength and thereby improve its ability to win adult contests over 107 
resources that determine the share of reproduction. Thus, investment in play-fighting confers a 108 
delayed benefit in adulthood and should be most valuable when survival is high and successful adults 109 
can expect a long reproductive career. Based on this assumed motor training benefit of play-fighting, 110 
our initial expectations were as follows: 111 
1. High investment in juvenile play-fighting should promote high levels of aggression in adult 112 
contests; conversely, high levels of adult aggression should promote high juvenile investment 113 
in play-fighting (to build up the necessary skills). 114 
2. As the cost of injuries from losing adult fights increases, individuals should invest more in 115 
play-fighting as a juvenile to improve their success in adult encounters, up to a point at which 116 
the cost of injuries is so high that adult fighting is no longer favoured (in which case sharing 117 
resources without aggression is preferred). 118 
3. As background mortality rises, individuals should invest less in play-fighting and mature 119 
sooner, because their expected lifespan is shorter and the value of their life is lower. They 120 
should also become more willing to take risks and hence show a high level of aggression in 121 
adult contests over access to reproduction. 122 
4. Strong reproductive skew should lead to a ‘fierce’ society in which adults show intense 123 
physical aggression to increase their chances of reproducing and juveniles invest in play-124 
fighting to improve their success in adult contests. Weak reproductive skew, by contrast, 125 
should lead to a more ‘peaceful’ society in which both adult aggression and competitive 126 
juvenile play-fighting are reduced, because reproduction is less dependent on the outcome of 127 
adult contests. 128 
 129 
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Methods 130 
 131 
We modelled a population of N = 1,000 haploid individuals with two consecutive life stages: a 132 
juvenile stage in which they engage in play-fighting interactions with other juveniles, followed by an 133 
adult stage in which they compete with other adults for access to resources. Each individual has three 134 
evolvable genetic traits: m, x and y. The value of m specifies the number of play-fights the individual 135 
will engage in as a juvenile before maturing to adulthood (m = 0,1,2,…). The values of x and y (136 
yx, ) determine its adult contest strategy as a function of its current strength s (see ‘Adult 137 
contests’, below). We track the evolution of these traits over a long sequence of discrete time steps, 138 
during which the following events occur: juvenile play-fights and adult contests; death from injury 139 
and background mortality; production of offspring to replace dead individuals; maturation of some 140 
individuals from the juvenile to the adult stage. We describe these events in turn below. 141 
 142 
Juvenile play-fights 143 
In each time step, juveniles are randomly assorted into dyads and engage in a play-fight, in which 144 
there is no winner or loser and no resources are at stake; if there is an odd number of juveniles, one 145 
of them (selected at random) does not interact in that time step. To represent the proposed motor 146 
training function of play-fighting (Brownlee, 1954; Byers & Walker, 1995; Fagen, 1981), we assume 147 
that the strength s of both participants increases by 1 unit as a result of the interaction. We also assume 148 
that there are no additional fitness costs of play-fighting beyond the background mortality rate 149 
experienced in all time steps (see ‘Mortality’, below). 150 
 151 
Adult contests 152 
Adults are randomly assorted into dyads and engage in contests over resources of fixed value V; if 153 
there is an odd number of adults, one of them (selected at random) does not interact in that time step. 154 
These adult contests are modelled as a Hawk–Dove game (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973): if both 155 
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contestants play Dove, they share the resource (pay-off V/2 for each contestant); if one plays Hawk 156 
and the other plays Dove, the former claims the resource (pay-off V) while the latter gains nothing 157 
(pay-off 0); and if both play Hawk, they fight over it. In the event of a fight, the outcome is determined 158 
by the contestants’ relative strengths: the probability P that individual i defeats opponent j is given 159 
by the logistic function P = (1+exp[−b(si − sj)])−1, where si and sj are their respective strengths and b 160 
is a parameter scaling the fighting advantage to the stronger individual (b = 0 indicates no advantage). 161 
The winner of a fight gains the resource (pay-off V) while the loser gains nothing (pay-off 0) and 162 
suffers an injury that with some small probability c results in its death (c > 0; see ‘Mortality’, below). 163 
As for juvenile play-fights, we assume that engaging in a fight (i.e. but not in Hawk–Dove or Dove–164 
Dove contests) increases the strength of both individuals by 1 unit, up to a maximum of smax = 1/d 165 
where d is the background probability of mortality (see ‘Mortality’, below). 166 
Adult contest decisions are assumed to depend on their own strength. The probability of 167 
playing Hawk (i.e. attacking the opponent), H, is given by the logistic function H = [1+exp(x−ys)]−1, 168 
where x and y are evolvable genetic traits that control, respectively, the inflection point of the function 169 
and its steepness with respect to the individual’s current strength s. In any given contest, this 170 
probability is converted to a binary outcome by drawing a random number r from a uniform 171 
distribution on the interval [0,1] and noting whether r < H (in which case the individual plays Hawk) 172 
or r ≥ H (in which case it plays Dove). 173 
 174 
Mortality 175 
With probability c, the loser of an adult fight (see above) dies from their injuries. In addition, there is 176 
a background mortality risk such that each time step a randomly selected fraction d of the population 177 
(both juveniles and adults) die from causes independent of their behaviour. In both cases these 178 
individuals are removed from the population and play no further part in the simulation. Note that in 179 
the absence of any fighting the expected lifespan is 1/d, which we set as the upper limit on strength 180 
smax. 181 
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 182 
Offspring production 183 
New offspring are produced to replace those individuals that have died from injuries incurred during 184 
fights or from background mortality, such that the population size is maintained at N = 1,000. For 185 
simplicity we model reproduction as an asexual process, with offspring inheriting their genetic values 186 
of m, x and y from a single parent. With corresponding probabilities μm, μx and μy these values are 187 
altered by mutation, by an amount drawn randomly from a uniform distribution (either 1, 2 or 3 in 188 
the case of m, or from the continuous distribution [0.0,0.4] in the case of x and y). The new offspring 189 
are born into the juvenile stage and begin life with zero strength and resources. 190 
Each offspring’s parent is selected randomly with a probability proportional to (ΣnV)φ, where 191 
the ΣnV is the total amount of resources it has accrued across all of its n adult contests so far and φ is 192 
a reproductive skew parameter that controls the extent to which reproduction is monopolised by those 193 
individuals with the most resources (φ ≥ 0). A value of φ = 0 therefore represents a situation where 194 
all adults have equal chance of reproducing regardless of their accumulated resources, while 195 
increasing values of φ represent increasingly strong degrees of skew. We use this parameter to induce 196 
variation in the intensity of adult competition along a continuum between ‘peaceful’ societies (low φ, 197 
implying weak benefits of excluding others from resources) and ‘fierce’ societies (high φ, implying 198 
strong benefits of excluding others from resources). 199 
 200 
Maturation 201 
Before the next round of interactions, the age (measured in number of time steps) of each surviving 202 
individual is incremented by one unit. Any juveniles who have reached their maturation point (i.e. 203 
their age is equal to m time steps) leave the juvenile stage and move to the adult stage, starting with 204 
the value of s they had achieved through play-fighting. 205 
 206 
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This sequence of events repeats in each time step of the simulation. We initialised each simulation 207 
with genetic values m = 0, x = 0 and y = 0 for all individuals, such that they mature immediately 208 
(without any investment in play-fighting) and then choose Hawk and Dove with equal probability in 209 
adult contests (regardless of their strength). We then tracked changes in juvenile play-fighting and 210 
adult aggression across the time steps, as the genetic values of m, x and y coevolved in response to 211 
selection. To represent the outcomes, we computed the following summary statistics: the relative 212 
investment in play-fighting as a fraction of the expected lifespan, m/d, which is influenced by the 213 
evolved value of m; and the proportion of adult encounters that escalate into physical fights, pfight, 214 
which is influenced by the evolved values of x and y. Table 2 lists the model parameters and their 215 
default values (i.e. the values used when systematically varying other parameters). The model was 216 
written in C++ and the code is provided as supplementary information (online appendix A). 217 
 218 
Results 219 
 220 
Trajectory of coevolution between adult aggression and juvenile play-fighting 221 
We simulated the coevolution of m, x and y over 50,000 time periods, running 20 replicate simulations 222 
for each parameter combination. In all simulations, both adult aggression and juvenile play-fighting 223 
initially increased, but thereafter their coevolution led to one of two outcomes: a high-play, high-224 
aggression outcome in which the evolved values of both m/d and pfight were close to 1, or a low-play, 225 
low-aggression outcome in which they were both close to zero (note that low-play, high-aggression 226 
and high-play, low-aggression outcomes were never seen). Which of the two outcomes resulted 227 
depended on the values of c and d, as shown in Fig. 1. Lower injury costs of losing a fight (c = 0.1) 228 
favoured escalated aggression in adult contests preceded by an extended period of juvenile play-229 
fighting (high-play, high-aggression; Fig. 1, top row), whereas high injury costs (c = 0.4) favoured 230 
more passive resolution of adult contests and minimal investment in juvenile play-fighting (low-play, 231 
low-aggression; Fig. 1, bottom row). For intermediate injury costs (c = 0.2, 0.3) the high-play, high-232 
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aggression outcome was favoured only at high background probabilities of mortality d, associated 233 
with a shorter expected lifespan (Fig. 1, middle rows). In some cases, the coevolutionary trajectory 234 
occasionally fluctuated between the high-play, high-aggression and low-play, low-aggression 235 
outcomes (e.g. for c = 0.3, d = 0.1; Fig. 1, right-hand panel, third row), indicating that intermediate 236 
levels of juvenile play-fighting and adult aggression were not evolutionarily stable. 237 
 238 
Adult contest strategy 239 
Fig. 2 shows the evolved strategy for adult aggression (probability of playing Hawk, H) and the 240 
evolved maturation point (m) under three of the parameter combinations shown in Fig. 1, with Figs 241 
2A (c = 0.1, d = 0.05) and 2B (c = 0.3, d = 0.1) corresponding to high-play, high-aggression outcomes 242 
and Fig. 2C (c = 0.4, d = 0.05) corresponding to a low-play, low-aggression outcome. In all three 243 
cases the curves typically plateau before (or soon after) the maturation point, indicating that the 244 
tendency to escalate adult conflicts is relatively insensitive to current strength. In the high-play, high-245 
aggression outcomes, juveniles build up their strength over a prolonged period of play-fighting and 246 
then always attack their opponent when they reach adulthood (Fig. 2A,B). In the low-play, low-247 
aggression outcome, in contrast, they mature early in life with very limited play-fighting experience, 248 
and then always play Dove as an adult (Fig. 2C). 249 
 250 
Impact of reproductive skew on coevolutionary outcomes 251 
The degree of reproductive skew (φ) has a pronounced impact on the coevolution between juvenile 252 
play-fighting and adult aggression. Strong reproductive skew (φ > 1), representing greater 253 
monopolisation of resources, favours high aggression in adulthood (Fig. 3A), i.e. a ‘fierce’ society, 254 
and high investment in juvenile play-fighting (Fig. 3B). Weaker skew (φ < 1), representing more 255 
equitable sharing of reproduction, leads to low levels of adult aggression (Fig. 3A), i.e. a more 256 
‘peaceful’ society, and limited juvenile play-fighting (Fig. 3B). The switch between these two 257 
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outcomes is abrupt, again suggesting that intermediate levels of adult aggression and juvenile play-258 
fighting are not evolutionarily stable. 259 
 260 
Discussion 261 
 262 
Our simulations showed that coevolution between juvenile play-fighting and adult aggression 263 
resulted in one of two outcomes. One outcome was a high-play, high-aggression situation in which 264 
almost all adult contests escalate into physical fights and individuals spend a substantial part of their 265 
lives preparing for this fierce competitive environment through an extended juvenile period of play-266 
fighting. The other outcome was a low-play, low-aggression situation in which almost all adult 267 
contests are resolved peacefully by sharing the contested resources without any escalation, and there 268 
is minimal investment in play-fighting early in life before juveniles progress to the adult stage. In 269 
both cases, the evolved adult contest strategy is relatively insensitive to variation in strength, either 270 
because by the time they mature individuals are always willing to escalate contests regardless of their 271 
own strength (high-play, high-aggression outcome), or because they are seldom willing to do so (low-272 
play, low-aggression outcome). Intermediate levels of adult aggression combined with moderate 273 
investment in play-fighting appear not to be evolutionarily stable. Which of the two outcomes results 274 
depends on the probabilities of death from injuries sustained during fights (c) and from background 275 
causes independent of behaviour (d), and on the strength of reproductive skew (φ). The high-play, 276 
high-aggression outcome is favoured by low injury costs of losing fights (low c), low expected future 277 
fitness prospects associated with a high background mortality rate (high d), and strong reproductive 278 
skew (high φ). The low-play, low-aggression outcome is favoured by high injury costs (high c), high 279 
expected future fitness (low d) and weak reproductive skew (low φ). 280 
We first briefly discuss how the pattern of adult aggression in our simulations relates to the 281 
predictions from game-theoretic models of animal conflict. In their model of repeated Hawk–Dove 282 
contests in a population with no variation in strength, Houston and McNamara (1991) showed that a 283 
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pure Hawk strategy (H = 1) is favoured when deaths from injury are rare (low c) but background 284 
mortality (d) is high. These conditions also favoured the high-aggression outcome in our simulations 285 
(Fig. 1), where strength could vary among individuals (due to differences in age and previous (play-286 
)fighting experience) and individuals randomly encountered both weaker and stronger opponents. 287 
Models by Crowley (2000) and McNamara and Houston (2005) incorporated variation in strength in 288 
a standard (non-repeated) Hawk–Dove game and predicted that when an animal knows its own 289 
strength but not that of its opponent (as assumed in our simulations) the evolutionarily stable strategy 290 
(ESS) is to play Hawk above a threshold level of strength and Dove otherwise. McNamara and 291 
Houston showed that this could lead to a stable intermediate level of fighting, providing losing fights 292 
is not too costly relative to the value of winning. In our simulations the evolved contest strategy does 293 
fit the predicted form, with a sudden switch from one behaviour to another above a threshold level of 294 
strength (Fig. 2), but unlike McNamara and Houston we found only very high (pfight ≈ 1) or very low 295 
(pfight ≈ 0) levels of fighting (Figs 1,3). A key difference is that whereas McNamara and Houston 296 
assumed that variation in strength was fixed, in our simulations individuals could increase their 297 
strength through play-fighting and adult fighting. For conditions conducive to aggressive behaviour 298 
(low c and high d), all individuals tended to escalate adult contests because their juvenile investment 299 
in play-fighting ensured that their strength at maturation was above the threshold for playing Hawk. 300 
This explains why intermediate levels of fighting were not stable in our simulations. 301 
Below we discuss the theoretical predictions of our model, the extent to which they are 302 
empirically supported and some possible directions for future work. 303 
 304 
Relationship between adult aggression and juvenile play-fighting 305 
Across simulations, adult aggression and juvenile play-fighting were positively correlated: high levels 306 
of adult aggression select for greater investment in play-fighting in the juvenile phase, and, 307 
reciprocally, high levels of play-fighting increase the expected pay-off from behaving aggressively 308 
as an adult. This was expected (Hypothesis 1), given that the motor training mechanism we 309 
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implemented in the model enables individuals to increase their adult fighting ability through engaging 310 
in play-fighting as juveniles. Although this is a commonly assumed function of play (Byers and 311 
Walker 1995; Potegal and Einon 1989; Taylor 1980), to our knowledge it has not been established 312 
whether rates of juvenile play-fighting are correlated with the intensity of adult aggression across 313 
species; testing this prediction using phylogenetically controlled analyses would be a useful direction 314 
for future research. 315 
Within species, there is mixed evidence that rates of play and adult aggression are linked. Play 316 
is positively correlated with later fighting skills in rats (Rattus rattus) and those individuals that play-317 
fight most are more aggressive overall (Taylor, 1980). In Syrian golden hamsters (Mesocricetus 318 
auratus), Pellis and Pellis (1988) found that increased levels of play-fighting were linked to greater 319 
values of later aggression. However, in a long-term study of meerkats (Suricata suricatta), Sharpe 320 
(2005) found no association between the frequency of play-fighting and adult fighting success. Some 321 
studies support a more general role of play in the development of adult skills. In Belding’s ground 322 
squirrels (Spermophilus beldingi), high rates of juvenile social play are associated with greater motor 323 
skills in adulthood, potentially leading to advantages in resource acquisition for squirrels that played 324 
more as juveniles (Nunes et al., 2004). Positive correlations between playfulness and skilfulness have 325 
also been found in common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus jacchus), in which wrestling behaviour 326 
facilitates avoidance of obstacles (Chalmers & Locke-Haydon, 1984), and in some species enhanced 327 
adult skills through play may reflect greater development of social cognition and associated neural 328 
circuits (Lewis, 2000; Pellis, Pellis, & Himmler, 2014). 329 
Our model assumes that juvenile play-fighting is a form of practice for adult fighting, but 330 
there is evidence that play-fighting has broader relevance for adult behaviour. Deprivation 331 
experiments, in which the opportunity for individuals to engage in play-fighting is artificially 332 
restricted, reveal a wide range of social and emotional deficits rather than a specific effect on fighting 333 
ability, suggesting that play is important more generally in the development of social competence 334 
(Pellis et al., 2014). For example, studies on rats and hamsters have shown that limiting juvenile play 335 
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experiences leads to impaired social skills and emotional regulation, accompanied by 336 
neuroanatomical changes in the prefrontal cortex (Bell et al., 2010; Burleson et al., 2016; Schneider 337 
et al., 2016; van den Berg et al., 1999). Models focused on more cooperative elements of play 338 
behaviour, such as that by Durand and Schank (2015), may be needed to explain some of these 339 
impacts on adult social relationships. 340 
 341 
Effects of mortality risk in fights and from other sources 342 
Whether coevolution led to the high-play, high-aggression outcome or the low-play, low-aggression 343 
outcome was strongly affected by the mortality risks, both from injuries sustained during fights and 344 
from background sources independent of behaviour. When losing fights is costly (high c), selection 345 
favours reduced adult aggression and more amicable sharing of resources (in support of Hypothesis 346 
2), which in turn lowers the incentive to engage in play-fighting. There is some empirical support for 347 
a negative relationship between injury risk and adult aggression: in roe deer (Capreolus capreolus), 348 
asymmetry in antler size increases the probability of dying in an encounter and decreases the number 349 
of escalated contests (Hoem, Melis, Linnell, & Andersen, 2007). We also observed that, while c was 350 
still low enough to favour the high-play, high-aggression outcome, there was a slight increase in play 351 
investment with increasing c (e.g. for d = 0.1 [right-hand column] in Fig. 1, compare c = 0.1 [top row] 352 
with c = 0.2 [second row]). This is because when adult contests are more risky (high pfight combined 353 
with moderately high c), it becomes particularly important to increase fighting ability through 354 
juvenile play-fighting. 355 
Increasing the background mortality rate (d) shortens the expected lifespan, which reduces the 356 
expected fitness from future encounters and favours a more short-term perspective (a form of the 357 
asset-protection principle; Clark, 1994). In our simulations, this selected for more risky, aggressive 358 
behaviour in adult contests, in line with Hypothesis 3. However, contrary to our expectations, higher 359 
background mortality did not select for reduced investment in play-fighting (as a proportion of the 360 
expected lifespan): rather, because of the coevolutionary feedback between adult and juvenile 361 
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strategies, high values of d favour a relatively extended period of juvenile play-fighting (within the 362 
constraints of a shortened lifespan) to prepare for the more aggressive adult environment. This is an 363 
interesting prediction because it contradicts previous suggestions, based on energetic costs, that the 364 
frequency of play behaviour should decline under harsh environmental conditions (Martin, 1982), for 365 
which there is some empirical support within species (Barrett, Dunbar, & Dunbar, 1992; Lee, 1984). 366 
This hypothesis ignores the possibility that those same conditions are also likely to influence adult 367 
competition over resources, which as our simulations highlight can have a strong impact on selection 368 
for play. For a clearer understanding of the conditions under which play behaviour is favoured, we 369 
urge researchers to consider the adult social environment alongside variation in resource availability 370 
and other extrinsic factors. 371 
 372 
Effect of reproductive skew 373 
Whether coevolution led to the high-play, high-aggression outcome or the low-play, low-aggression 374 
outcome was also strongly affected by the degree of reproductive skew (φ), in terms of the extent to 375 
which reproduction was monopolised by those with the most resources. As expected (Hypothesis 4), 376 
strong reproductive skew (φ > 1) favours high aggression in adulthood preceded by an extended 377 
period of juvenile play-fighting, whereas weaker skew (φ < 1) favours amicable sharing of resources 378 
and only a brief period of play-fighting before progressing to the adult stage. Thus our model predicts 379 
that, all else being equal, animals that live in ‘fierce’ societies should invest more in juvenile play-380 
fighting than those that live in relatively peaceful societies. 381 
 382 
Empirical evidence in Macaca 383 
We examined empirical support for the predicted pattern of co-variation between adult societal 384 
structure and juvenile play-fighting using data from the genus Macaca, where there is substantial 385 
variation in dominance styles. Thierry (2000) classified the 18 species in this genus according to their 386 
social system, along a continuum from so-called ‘despotic’ to ‘egalitarian’ systems. The most 387 
Page 15 of 35 Ethology
For Peer Review
 
 
despotic systems (grade 1), seen in M. mulatta, M. fuscata and M. cyclopis, are characterised by 388 
unequal distribution of reproductive opportunities between dominants and subordinates, kin-centric 389 
power asymmetries and higher incidence of biting by dominants in within-troop disputes (Aureli, 390 
Das, & Veenema, 1997; Caldecott, 1986; Kutsukake & Castles, 2001; Thierry, 1985). In the most 391 
egalitarian systems (grade 4), by contrast, seen in M. tonkeana, M. maura, M. nigra, M. nigrescens, 392 
M. hecki and M. ochreata, access to resources is less constrained by kinship ties, interactions are less 393 
aggressive and biting less frequent but more likely to be reciprocated (Butovskaya & Kozintsev 394 
1996). Applying the predictions of our model we might therefore expect that despotic species would 395 
show greater investment than egalitarian species in juvenile play-fighting, as preparation for a more 396 
fiercely competitive adult environment. 397 
In the few studies directly comparing the play behaviour of a despotic species (M. fuscata) 398 
with an egalitarian species (either M. tonkeana or M. nigra), no difference was reported in the overall 399 
frequency of play (Petit et al. 2008, Reinhart et al. 2010; Scopa & Palagi 2016). Across other studies, 400 
methodological differences, the use of both captive and free-living groups, variation in housing 401 
conditions and the lack of consistent or standardised measures makes it difficult to compare the 402 
overall frequency of play-fighting across species. However, for seven of the 18 species classified by 403 
Thierry (2000) there are some data on the extent to which play-fighting is competitive or cooperative 404 
(Petit et al., 2008; Reinhart, 2008; Reinhart et al., 2010). Table 3 summarises variation in the style of 405 
play-fighting across these seven species, ranging from the despotic M. mulatta and M. fuscata to the 406 
egalitarian M. tonkeana and M. nigra. The general pattern is that egalitarian species, such as Tonkean 407 
macaques (M. tonkeana) and crested macaques (M. nigra), adopt a more cooperative style of social 408 
play than the competitive play-fighting seen in despotic species such as Japanese macaques (M. 409 
fuscata), with egalitarian species showing more reciprocal rough-and-tumble play (e.g. higher 410 
frequency of wrestling) and despotic species more cautious play (e.g. face-to-face body orientation 411 
between partners to avoid vulnerable positions; Ciani, Dall’Olio, Stanyon, & Palagi, 2012; Palagi et 412 
al., 2015; Petit et al., 2008; Reinhart, 2008; Reinhart et al., 2010; Scopa & Palagi, 2016; Thierry, 413 
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1985, 2000). For example, Tonkean macaques engage in longer bouts of play and have a relatively 414 
cooperative style of play-fighting compared to the more competitive style of play-fighting in Japanese 415 
macaques, which involves different behavioural patterns and preferred body targets (Ciani et al., 416 
2012; Reinhart et al., 2010). 417 
 418 
Limitations and future directions 419 
The pattern across macaque species provides only partial support for our model. The greater emphasis 420 
on competitive elements of play-fighting in more despotic species fits with the idea that this serves 421 
as practice for potentially dangerous adult fighting. At the same time, our model is unable to account 422 
for investment in other, more cooperative elements of play seen in more egalitarian species. The 423 
motor training mechanism we implemented may not be appropriate for egalitarian societies, in which 424 
play may instead have evolved to promote social cohesion (Ciani et al., 2012; Palagi 2006). It has 425 
been suggested that more egalitarian species show more adult–adult play, which enhances social 426 
cohesion across individuals, whereas more despotic species prioritise adult–juvenile play, which has 427 
a teaching function for the young (social bridge mechanism; Mancini & Palagi, 2009). This limits the 428 
scope of our model and highlights that, rather than being a unitary phenomenon, different forms of 429 
play-fighting may require different functional explanations. In this regard, the combination of our 430 
own model (focused on competitive play-fighting) and Durand and Schank’s (2015) model (focused 431 
on cooperative play-fighting) may together offer a more satisfactory explanation for patterns of play-432 
fighting than either model alone. However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions because the data 433 
are so patchy. A useful direction for future work would be to collect more systematic, directly 434 
comparable data on the relative investment in competitive versus cooperative play-fighting across the 435 
Macaca genus, to establish more clearly how this relates to the despotic–egalitarian spectrum of 436 
dominance hierarchies. 437 
Besides incorporating other proposed functions of play-fighting, our model could be extended 438 
in a number of useful directions. The present implementation had no explicit representation of males 439 
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and females, instead (for simplicity) modelling reproduction as asexual and considering all 440 
individuals to be of the same type. Modelling separate dominance hierarchies for males and females 441 
would potentially allow us to predict sex differences in the intensity of adult aggression and patterns 442 
of play-fighting behaviour. Another possibility would be to incorporate sexual dimorphism and 443 
intrasexual variation in weaponry (e.g. canine size), to investigate how this affects the willingness to 444 
escalate disputes into physical fights. It would also be interesting to study how pre-existing 445 
differences in fighting ability, which may subsequently be amplified or dampened by motor training, 446 
would affect the predicted patterns of juvenile play-fighting and adult aggression. We leave these 447 
possible extensions to future work. 448 
 449 
Conclusion 450 
Despite decades of research and a wealth of empirical data, the adaptive significance of play-fighting 451 
behaviour remains unclear. The model we have presented here, implementing the motor training 452 
hypothesis, adds to a small number of theoretical studies on play-fighting, which are invaluable in 453 
refining predictions and identifying the conditions under which play-fighting is expected to evolve. 454 
Our model highlights the importance of considering play-fighting behaviour in a broader life-history 455 
context, taking into account its coevolution with the adult social environment—in particular, the 456 
intensity and aggressiveness of adult competition. A comparison of empirical findings from despotic 457 
and egalitarian macaque societies reveals the need for more directly comparable data and also 458 
underscores the limited scope of our model, suggesting that play-fighting is more likely a 459 
multidimensional phenomenon with different adaptive functions applying to competitive and 460 
cooperative forms of play. More empirical and theoretical studies are needed to investigate how and 461 
why play-fighting has evolved, what consequences this has for shaping adult aggression and 462 
conversely how adult competition under different societal structures affects juvenile investment in 463 
play-fighting. 464 
 465 
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Tables 628 
 629 
Table 1 
Comparison between cooperative and competitive aspects of play-fighting, based on Reinhart (2008) 
and Pellis, Pellis and Reinhart (2010) 
Cooperative play Competitive play 
Attacks are concentrated on species-typical playful body 
targets, rather than agonistic ones 
Agonistic body targets are more often involved 
Lack of defensive elements in play sequences Defensive component is present 
Play body targets are exposed to the partner 
Body targets are protected or hidden from the 
partner 
Frequent role reversals of attacker and defender occur 
during a single play bout with the same partner 
Role reversals are prevented or resisted 
Play-fighting occurs with many different peers, 
sometimes with multiple individuals at the same time 
(i.e. polyadic play) 
Play-fighting interactions are brief and only a few 
different partners are involved 
 630 
 631 
Table 2 
Parameters of the model and their default values 
Symbol Interpretation Default value 
V Value of resources at stake in each adult contest 1 
b Fighting advantage to a stronger individual 0.5 
c Probability of death from injuries when losing a fight 0.3 
d Background probability of mortality per time step 0.1 
φ 
Reproductive skew parameter, determining how strongly 
reproduction is monopolised by those with most resources 
1.0 
N Population size 1,000 
μm Probability of mutation in value of genetic trait m 0.05 
μx Probability of mutation in value of genetic trait x 0.05 
μy Probability of mutation in value of genetic trait y 0.05 
 632 
  633 
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 634 
Table 3  
Description of social system (from 1 = despotic to 4 = egalitarian) and 
the style of play-fighting in seven Macaca spp. 
Species Social system†1 Style of play-fighting 
M. mulatta 1 mixed‡2,3,4,5,6 
M. fuscata 1 mainly competitive2,7,8,9 
M. fascicularis 2 mainly competitive‡2 
M. sylvanus 3 mainly competitive‡2,10 
M. radiata 3 mixed2 
M. tonkeana 4 mainly cooperative8,9 
M. nigra 4 mainly cooperative7,11 
† The social system is characterised along the despotic–egalitarian continuum. Grade 1 = most despotic; 635 
unequal distribution of reproductive opportunities between dominants and subordinates and kin-centric power 636 
asymmetry (Aureli, Das & Veenema, 1997; Katsukake & Castles 2001). Grade 4 = most egalitarian; less 637 
constrained by kinship ties in accessing resources and characterised by more friendly interactions (Butovskaya 638 
& Kozintsev 1996). 639 
‡ Classification of play-fighting style in M. mulatta, M. fascicularis and M. sylvanus is tentative, based on 640 
available descriptions in the literature (Symons, 1978; Levy, 1979; Tartabini & Dienske, 1979; Caine & 641 
Mitchell, 1979; Pellis et al., 2010); more systematic data are needed to confirm the nature of play-fighting in 642 
these species.  643 
References: 1 Thierry, 2000; 2 Caine & Mitchell, 1979; 3 Pellis et al., 2010; 4 Levy, 1979; 5 Tartabini & Dienske, 644 
1979; 6 Symons, 1978; 7 Petit et al., 2008; 8 Reinhart et al., 2010; 9 Scopa & Palagi, 2016; 10 Kipper & Todt, 645 
2002; 11 Nickelson & Lockard, 1978. 646 
  647 
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Figure legends 648 
 649 
Figure 1. Coevolutionary trajectories (over 50,000 time steps) of adult aggression (proportion of 650 
contests that escalate into a fight, pfight) and relative investment in juvenile play-fighting as a fraction 651 
of expected lifespan (m/d; population mean values), for varying probabilities of death from 652 
background sources (d = 0.05, 0.075, 0.1, increasing left to right) and from injuries sustained during 653 
fighting (c = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, increasing top to bottom). Grey lines show the values from 20 replicate 654 
simulation runs, while the black line shows the median across all replicates, with points plotted every 655 
100 time steps. The grey square indicates the starting point of the simulations (pfight = 0 and m/d = 0, 656 
at time step 0) and the numbers next to the grey circles indicate how many thousands of time steps 657 
have elapsed by that point. Other parameter values: V = 1, b = 0.5, φ = 1.0, N = 1,000, μm = μx = μy = 658 
0.05. 659 
 660 
Figure 2. Adult contest strategy (probability of playing Hawk, H) as a function of strength (s) based 661 
on evolved population mean values of x and y after 50,000 time steps, for the following probabilities 662 
of death from background sources (d) and from injuries sustained during fighting (c): (A) c = 0.1, d 663 
= 0.05; (B) c = 0.3, d = 0.1; (C) c = 0.4, d = 0.05. The vertical arrows indicate the evolved population 664 
mean values of the maturation point m (number of time steps spent play-fighting as a juvenile, before 665 
transitioning to the adult stage). Grey curves and arrows show the values from 20 replicate simulation 666 
runs, while the black curve and arrow show the median across all replicates. Other parameter values: 667 
V = 1, b = 0.5, φ = 1.0, N = 1,000, μm = μx = μy = 0.05. 668 
 669 
Figure 3. Evolved levels (after 50,000 time steps) of (A) adult aggression (proportion of contests that 670 
escalate into a fight, pfight) and (B) investment in juvenile play-fighting (number of time steps before 671 
maturing, m; population mean values), for varying degrees of reproductive skew (parameter φ). Black 672 
dots show the values from 20 replicate simulation runs, while the grey boxes show the median and 673 
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interquartile range (IQR) across all replicates (with whiskers extending to 1.5 × IQR). Other 674 
parameter values: V = 1, b = 0.5, c = 0.3, d = 0.1, N = 1,000, μm = μx = μy = 0.05. 675 
Page 29 of 35 Ethology
For Peer Review
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
 (
p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
2
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
 (
p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
(p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
 (
p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
2
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
 (
p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
2 3
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
(p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
(p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
2
1
34
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
(p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
23
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
(p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
2 3
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
(p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
2
1
3
4
56
7
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
(p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
234
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
(p
fi
g
h
t)
relative investment in play-fighting (m/d)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
2
d = 0.05 d = 0.075 d = 0.1
c
=
 0
.1
c
=
 0
.2
c
=
 0
.3
c
=
 0
.4
Page 30 of 35Ethology
For Peer Review
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 5 10 15 20
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
p
la
y
in
g
 H
aw
k
 (
H
)
strength (s)
Page 31 of 35 Ethology
For Peer Review
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 2 4 6 8 10
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
p
la
y
in
g
 H
aw
k
 (
H
)
strength (s)
Page 32 of 35Ethology
For Peer Review
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 2 4 6 8 10
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
p
la
y
in
g
 H
aw
k
 (
H
)
strength (s)
Page 33 of 35 Ethology
For Peer Review
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.01 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
ad
u
lt
 a
g
g
re
ss
io
n
 (
p
fi
g
h
t)
strength of reproductive skew (φ)
Page 34 of 35Ethology
For Peer Review
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.01 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
in
 p
la
y
-f
ig
h
ti
n
g
 (
m
)
strength of reproductive skew (φ)
Page 35 of 35 Ethology
